Informal unemployment and education by unknown
IZA Journal of Labor EconomicsKolm and Larsen IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:8 
DOI 10.1186/s40172-016-0048-6
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Informal unemployment and education




Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
This paper develops a four-sector equilibrium search and matching model with
informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. We show that
underground activities reduce educational attainments if informal employment
opportunities mainly are available for low-educated workers. A more zealous
enforcement policy will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the
attractiveness of remaining a low-educated worker. However, unemployment also
increases. Characterizing the optimal enforcement policies, we find that relatively more
audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low-educated workers;
elsewise, a too low stock of educated workers is materialized.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have been puzzled by the fact that observed tax evasion in high-income
countries, despite low audit rates and fairly modest fines, is substantially lower than
what is predicted by theory. Andreoni et al. (1998) argue that this discrepancy is most
likely explained by non-economic factors, such as morality, guilt, and shame. However,
Kleven et al. (2011), who conducted a large field experiment on individual tax filers in
Denmark, suggest that this discrepancy is explained by the degree of third-party report-
ing. As incomes for individuals are not self-reported, rather reported by a third party such
as the employer, it is difficult, and thus costly, to evade taxes. These costs, both due to
third-party reporting, or even morality, guilt, or shame, tend to reduce the profitability of
evading taxes and limit the size of the informal sector, although the expected punishment
fees are low relative to taxes.
In this paper, we argue that these types of costs may explain why highly educated work-
ers to a lesser extent evade taxes andwork informally than low-educated workers. If highly
educated workers to a smaller extent work in industries which handle cash payments and
to a larger extent are subject to third-party reporting, it will be more difficult, and thus
more costly, for these workers to evade taxes.
This is consistent with data. Evidence indicates that manual workers, or workers with
a lower level of formal education, to a substantially higher degree face informal employ-
ment opportunities compared to highly educated workers. Pedersen (2003), using the
same questionnaire design for Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden,
confirms that skilled blue collar workers carry out more informal market activities than
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others. Figure 1 shows the extent of informal activities in the five countries by industry.
Most informal work are carried out in the construction sector, followed by the agricultural
sector, hotels, and restaurants. This pattern is also confirmed for Denmark, by Hvidtfeldt
et al. (2011), and for Germany, by Haigner et al. (2011), using representative survey
data.
Furthermore, performing logistic regressions for the five countries, Pedersen (2003)
confirms that the likelihood of informal market activities falls with the length of educa-
tion. In addition, Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) show for Italy that mainly workers at the
lower end of the skill distribution engage in informal activities.
The fact that mainly low-educated workers seem to work in the informal sector suggests
that the choice of educational attainment is potentially distorted. Informal employment
opportunities foregone with education may simply reduce the incentives for workers to
acquire education.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the equilibrium impact of underground activities
on labour market outcomes and educational attainment in high-income countries, as well
as to characterize the optimal enforcement policy. Although harsher punishment policies
may correct for a too low stock of educated workers, total unemployment may increase
with such policy. In fact, we have little guidance from research to what extent formal
sector jobs replace jobs in the underground economy as those jobs disappear with stricter
informal sector punishment.
For this purpose, we develop a four-sector general equilibrium model featuring match-
ing frictions on the labour market. Unemployed workers search for jobs in both a formal
and an informal sector, and workers decide whether or not to acquire higher education
based on their ability levels. Education is considered to be a once and for all investment
in human capital and takes place as soon as the worker enters the labour market.1
In order to isolate the mechanisms and increase the transparency of the model, we keep
the differences between the formal and informal sectors at a minimum.2 The only dissim-
ilarities between the sectors are that taxes are not paid in the latter and that productivity
in the formal sector may be higher than productivity in the informal sector. Instead of
paying taxes, informal sector firms have to pay a fine in case they are hit by an audit and
detected as tax cheaters. In addition, firms in the informal sector are assumed to face
concealment costs. In our model, we let concealment costs capture costs associated with
Fig. 1 Fraction of informal sector work by industry. Pedersen (2003)
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concealing taxable income due to third-party reporting or even morality, guilt, or shame.
The costs reduce the profitability of evading taxes and limit the size of the informal sec-
tor although the expected punishment fees are low relative to taxes. In line with Kleven
et al. (2011), we also let these costs be higher the more income that is hidden from the tax
authorities.
We find that underground activities reduce the incentives to acquire higher educa-
tion if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low-educated workers.
More zealous enforcement policies will in this case improve educational incentives
as these reduce the attractiveness of remaining a low-educated worker. However, if
also highly educated workers to a large extent are exposed to informal employment
opportunities, the incentives to acquire higher education may fall with stricter enforce-
ment policies as underground work pays off better to workers with high productiv-
ity. Moreover, we find that actual unemployment most likely increases, although the
official unemployment falls. Finally, characterizing the optimal enforcement policies,
we find that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector employ-
ing low-educated workers; elsewise, the outcome is a too low stock of educated
workers.
The present paper extends the strand of tax evasion literature which departs from
the assumption of imperfectly competitive labour markets by incorporating involuntary
unemployment through the inclusion of search frictions.3 See, for example, Fugazza and
Jacques (2004), Boeri and Garibaldi (2005), and Kolm and Larsen (2006) who also model
underground activities in high-income countries. These studies focus on labour market
outcomes and rely on asymmetries between the formal and the informal sector, such as
heterogeneity in morality, in order to explain the co-existence of a formal and an informal
sector.
There are also numerous studies based on search theoretical frameworks investigating
issues of informal employment from the point of view of low- and middle-income coun-
tries. As one can argue that the nature of the informal sector can be quite different in
low- and middle-income countries compared to high-income countries, the modelling
strategies usually differ in these set-ups. As pointed out by La Porta and Shleifer (2014),
the informal sector in low- and middle-income countries is usually huge and contains
small, unproductive, and stagnant firms. Moreover, the informal sector in this literature
is usually seen as an unregulated sector.
For an example, taking a Latin American perspective, see Albrecht et al. (2009) that
accounts for worker heterogeneity and considers the impact of payroll taxes and severance
pay on unemployment in the presence of an informal sector. The informal sector can be
seen as an unregulated sector which is not affected by payroll taxes and other formal
policies.4 The recent study by Meghir et al. (2015) takes a slightly different modelling
approach in its focus on underground activities in Brazil as the paper considers on-the-
job-search and firm heterogeneity. Workers may search for jobs both in the formal and
the informal sector, and search frictions make it profitable for firms to start both types of
jobs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an empirical background and
motivation for the paper. In Section 3, the model is set up. Section 4 offers a comparative
statics analysis of an increase in the relative punishment of informal activities. Section 5
considers optimal policy, and finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2 Background andmotivation
As individuals engaged in underground work do not wish to be identified, it is notori-
ously difficult to collect accurate information about these activities. For natural reasons,
we therefore have limited knowledge about the empirical relationships between informal
activities and other economic outcomes.
In this section, we construct a cross-sectional data set of 24 OECD countries to inves-
tigate the relationships between factors affecting underground activities and educational
outcomes. All OECD countries are included in the sample provided that we have data on
the size of the informal sector and information on the legal and regulatory framework
for the purpose of tax compliance collected by the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (OECD 2012).
Since the informal economy cannot directly be measured, one has to rely on indi-
cators that capture informal sector activities in order to estimate the size of the
sector. Here we use the most recent estimates derived by Schneider et al. (2010).
Instead of using a method which assumes that a single factor or indicator can cap-
ture all activities in the informal sector, such as the currency demand approach or
the electricity approach, they estimate the size of the informal sector using a method
which includes multiple causes and indicators of the informal sector.5 Figure 2 pro-
vides a picture of how large the informal sector is in relation to GDP in the different
countries.
If, as we argue, informal employment opportunities are foregone with higher education,
we should observe a lower stock of educated workers in countries where it is more prof-
itable to work in the underground economy. Thus, countries with less strict enforcement
policies or lower concealment costs relative to the tax burden should have a smaller stock
of highly educated workers.
Tomeasure the costs of informal sector work in a country, we construct a variable based
on the legal and regulatory framework on the availability of, and access to, information of
importance for tax compliance. The data used is collected by the Global Forum on Trans-
parency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (OECD 2012). The Global Forum
has set out a large number of standards in order to increase tax compliance, and through
Fig. 2 The size of the shadow economy as a fraction of GDP for each country in 2007
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a process of peer reviewing, the Forum assesses the legal and administrative framework
in each member country. More specifically, the peer-reviewing process provides informa-
tion if the standards are “in place”, “in place but there is need for improvements”, and “not
in place”. From this information, we construct an index capturing the costs of evading
taxes.6
The cost of evading taxes needs to be related to the cost of not evading taxes.7 We let
these costs be captured by the tax wedge of total labour costs to the employer relative to
the corresponding net take-home pay for the average single worker without children. This
data from the OECD Taxing Wages database provides unique information on the income
taxes paid by workers and the family benefits received in the form of cash transfers as well
as the social security contributions and payroll taxes paid by their employers, for each of
the OECD countries.
Figure 3 plots the percentage of the total population, 25–64 years old, holding a tertiary
education in 2007 (OECD 2012) against our measure for the cost of evading taxes relative
to not evading taxes. Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a positive correlation
between the measures; the less attractive it is to work in the informal sector, the more
workers will choose a higher education.
In Fig. 4, the aim is to see if the relative cost of evading taxes is negatively correlated
with the size of the informal sector. Indeed, we observe a negative correlation between
the size of the underground economy as a fraction of GDP and the percentage of the
25–64 years old of the population holding a tertiary education. Thus, economies where
the informal sector is more extensive also tend to be economies where a lower fraction of
the population educates themselves.
Clearly, as it is challenging to get an accurate measure of the size of the informal sec-
tor and, as we have done here, to get a measure of the costs of evading taxes, this section
only serves to provide correlations between the variables in focus. To identify causal
relationships between, on the one hand, tax and punishment policies and, on the other
hand, educational outcomes is giving the available data an overwhelming task. Next, we
build an equilibrium model to investigate these relationships, as well as to pin down the
mechanisms.
Fig. 3 Fraction of 25–64 years old with tertiary education as a function of the wedge between the informal
and the formal sector for 2007
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Fig. 4 Fraction of 25–64 years old with tertiary education as a function of the size of the shadow economy as
a fraction of GDP in 2007
3 Themodel
This section develops a four-sector general equilibrium model with formal and informal
sector employment opportunities and educational choice. Workers differ in the ability to
acquire education. Abilities, e, are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, e ∈ [ 0, 1], and
the cost of higher education, c(e), is decreasing in ability. Thus, workers with a high level
of ability will find it more than worthwhile to invest in higher education, whereas workers
with low ability will not. Workers not attaining higher education will from now on be
referred to as manual workers. Both manual and highly educated workers allocate search
effort optimally between the formal and the informal sector. Once matched with a firm,
they bargain over the wage. The economy thus consists of four sectors: the formal and
informal sectors for manual workers (denoted F ,m and I,m) and the formal and informal
sectors for highly educated workers (denoted F , h and I, h).
3.1 Matching
Manual and highly educated workers search for jobs in both a formal and an informal
sector. For simplicity, we assume that only unemployed workers search for jobs. This is a
simplification, i.e. we do not acknowledge that the connection to the labour market given
by working in the formal or informal sector may bring about job opportunities not avail-













2 , where Xjl is the sectorial matching rate, v
j
l is the sectorial
vacancy rate, and ul is the unemployment rate and j = F , I and l = m, h. The rates are
defined as the numbers relatively to the labour force of manual and highly educated work-
ers, respectively. The exponents in the matching function are set to be equal to half in
order to simplify the welfare analysis where we derive the optimal tax and punishment
system when we have imposed the traditional Hosios condition. In that case, we can dis-
regard congestion externalities as the elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy is
equal to the bargaining power of workers in a symmetric Nash bargaining situation.8
Workers allocate search effort optimally across the formal and the informal sector. A
worker with educational level l will direct σ Fl units of search for a formal sector job and σ Il
units of search for an informal sector job. Thus, workers with different levels of education
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may differ in their allocation of search time across a formal and informal sector. Each
worker’s total search intensity is, however, exogenously given and normalized to unity,
i.e. σ Fl + σ Il = 1, l = m, h. The parameter γ < 1 captures the effectiveness of search
falls with search effort, i.e. the first unit of search in one sector is more effective than
the subsequent units of search. This could capture that different search methods are used
when searching for a job in a market. The more time that is used in order to search in a
market, the less efficient search methods have to be used. The transition rates into infor-













2 , where θ Il = vIl/
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σ Il
)γ ul) and θFl = vFl / ((1 − σ Il )γ ul) are labour
market tightness, l = m, h, measured in effective search units. The rates at which vacant





)− 12 , j = F , I, l = m, h.
3.2 Value functions
LetUl, EFl , and EIl denote the expected present values of unemployment and employment
for manual and highly educated workers. The value functions for worker i then reads







)− aUli, l = m, h, (1)




− aEFli , l = m, h, (2)
rEIli = R + wIli + s
(
Ul − EIli
)− aEIli, l = m, h, (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, wjl is the sector wage, and s is the exogenous sep-
aration rate. R is a lump sum transfer that all individuals receive from the government
which reflects that the government has some positive revenue requirements.9 The param-
eter a is the rate by which a worker is dying, and it captures that there is a constant flow of
workers out of the labour market at each instant of time. Analogously, there is an equally
sized flow of workers into the labour market each time period as people are born at the
same rate. This keeps the population constant, normalized to unity, and enables us to look
at the impact of various policies on educational attainment despite the fact that education
is an irreversible investment.
Let J jl and V
j
l j = F , I represent the expected present values of an occupied job and a
vacant job in the formal and informal sectors, respectively. The arbitrage equations for
formal and informal sector jobs paying the wage wjli j = F , I and a vacant job are then









− kyFl − aVFl , l = m, h, (5)
rJIli = yIl − wIli (1 + pα + κl) + s
(
VIl − JIli
)− aJIli, l = m, h, (6)
rV Il = qIl
(
JIl − VIl
)− kyIl − aVIl , l = m, h, (7)
where z is the payroll tax rate and yjl, j = F , I, l = m, h, is productivity. The parameter p
is the auditing rate which captures the probability of being detected employing a worker
in the informal sector and α is the associated firm punishment fee rate. Vacancy costs are
indexed by factor k to the productivity in the sector and written kyjl , j = F , I, l = m, h.10
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The concealment costs, κl, l = m, h, capture that it is costly to hide income from the
tax authorities. The costs could, for example, capture what Kleven et al. (2011) refer to
as third-party reporting. When there is third-party reporting of income, such as the firm
reporting the wage payments directly to the tax authorities, this has to be agreed upon
also by the worker, which is costly. These concealment costs could also be other direct
costs associated with concealing evasion, as well as morality costs associated with evading
taxes.
If firms hiring highly educated workers have a harder time concealing their activities
than firms hiring manual workers, then κh > κm. This is the case if, for example, third-
party reporting is more common for highly educated workers, or as assumed in Kleven
et al. (2011), the marginal costs of evasion increase with the amount of income evaded.
Although this is likely to be the case, we do not a priori impose any restriction on the
values of κl, l = h,m.
In order to improve the transparency of the model, we disregard taxation, expected
punishment, and concealment costs on the worker side. This is of no importance for the
results.
The unemployed worker i allocates search between the two sectors, σ Ili, in order to max-
imize the value of unemployment, rUli. A necessary condition for an interior solution is
that γ < 1, which holds by assumption. The first-order condition can be written as
(









2 EFl − Uli
EIl − Uli
, l = m, h. (8)
Workers allocate their search between sectors to equalize the net marginal returns to
search effort across the two sectors.
3.3 Wage determination
When a worker and firmmeet, they bargain over the wage,wjli, taking economy-wide vari-
ables as given. The first-order conditions from the Nash bargaining with equal bargaining










(1 + pα + κl) , l = m, h, (10)
where we have imposed symmetry and the free entry condition, Vjl = 0, j = F , I, l =
m, h.
We can now derive an equation determining how search is allocated between the formal
and the informal sectors in a symmetric equilibrium by substituting (9) and (10) into (8)






from (5) and (7) together with free entry. This yields
(











ψl, l = m, h, (11)
where ψl = 1+pα+κl1+z is the cost wedge between the informal sector and the formal sec-
tor. When workers allocate their search between the formal and the informal sectors in
equilibrium, they account for the wedge, ψl, and for the formal relative to the informal
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sectorial tightness, θFl /θ Il , as well as for relative productivity, yFl /yIl . It follows that rel-
atively more search will be directed towards the formal sector if expected punishment
plus concealment costs are higher than the tax payments, i.e. if ψl > 1, if formal sector
tightness exceeds informal sector tightness (i.e. θFl /θ Il > 1), and/or if productivity in the
formal sector is higher than productivity in the informal sector, yFl /yIl > 1, and vice versa
when ψl < 1, θFl /θ Il < 1, and yFl /yIl < 1. By use of Eqs. (1)–(7) and (32) in Eqs. (9) and
(10), equilibrium producer wages, ωjl, are given by






1 + k θ
F
l(
1 − σ Il
)1−γ
)
l = m, h, (12)












, l = m, h. (13)
An increase in tightness, θ jl , makes it easier for an unemployed worker to find a job and
at the same time harder for a firm to fill a vacancy. This improves the worker’s relative
bargaining position, resulting in higher wage demands. An increase in search will instead
increase the firm’s relative bargaining position. This is the case as firms will then find it
easier to match with a new worker in case of no agreement. The improved bargaining
position for firms moderates wage pressure.
3.4 Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal sector and the informal sector are determined by
Eqs. (4),(5), (6), and (7) using the free entry condition and the wage Eqs. (33) and (34):









1 − σ Ili
)1−γ
)
, l = h, l, (14)








, l = h, l. (15)







)1−γ yFlyIl ψl, in (15), it becomes clear that the wedge, ψl, and productivity differences,
yFl /yIl , are the crucial factors determining the size of the formal sector in relation to the
informal sector.11 In case productivity is the same in the formal and informal sectors,
hence, yFl /yIl = 1, then when ψl > 1, and thus expected punishment plus concealment
costs are higher than payroll taxes, informal sector producer wages are higher than for-
mal sector producer wages. In this case, it is relatively more attractive for firms to enter
the formal sector, which makes formal sector tightness exceed informal sector tightness.
Hence, we obtain that θFl > θ Il and σ Il <
1









ψl < 1. Notice that the formal sector exceeds the informal sector θFl > θ Il
and σ Il <
1
2 , l = m, h both if the wedge is equal to 1, ψl = 1, and the formal sector is
more productive than the informal sector, yFl /yIl > 1, as well as if the formal and informal
sectors are equally productive and the wedge is larger than 1, ψl > 1.
As the formal sector exceeds the informal sector in size in most high-income countries,




ψl > 1. This implies considering the
situation when the expected punishment rate plus concealment costs exceed the tax rate,
i.e. pα + κl > z, when both the formal and informal sectors are equally productive, which
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does not seem unrealistic given a broad interpretation of concealment costs. In fact, as
discussed in the introduction, positive concealment costs κl > 0 such that pα + κl > z
could potentially explain the puzzle of why we observe a relatively small informal sector
although we, at the same time, observe rather low audit rates and fairly modest fines,
i.e. pα < z. In addition, when the productivity in the formal sector exceeds that of the
informal sector, the formal sector is even more likely to exceed the informal sector in size.
However, we do not a priori impose any restrictions on the size of ψl, pα, or κl when
deriving the results in this paper. When discussing results that depend on the size of ψl,
however, we focus the discussion on what we believe is the most realistic case.
In Fig. 5, we can use Eqs. (14) and (15) to derive relative tightness as a function of search
intensity and illustrate this equation in a (σ Il , θFl /θ Il ) diagram together with Eq. (11). Both
equations have a negative slope, and the former curve will be flatter than the latter around
the equilibrium insuring a stable equilibrium.12 When the wedge increases, ψ ′l > ψl (or
yFl /yIl increases), then the search intensity decreases for given relative labourmarket tight-
ness, θFl /θ Il ; this reduction in search intensity increases θFl /θ Il and thereby σ Il until a new
equilibrium is reached. In Fig. 5, we have left out subscript l to ease exposition.
3.5 Education
When workers decide whether to acquire higher education or remain as manual workers,
they compare the value of unemployment as an educated worker and the associated costs
of higher education to the value of unemployment as a manual worker. Workers that find
it optimal to acquire higher education view this as a once and for all investment in human
capital, and it takes place as soon as the worker enters the labour market. As in most
studies, we assume that education is costly but it takes no time.13 The cost of higher
education depends on individual ability, ei ∈[ 0, 1], and is given by c(ei), where c′(ei) < 0
and c′′ (ei) > 0.14
The marginal worker has an ability level, eˆ, which makes him or her just indifferent
between acquiring higher education and remaining as a manual worker. We write the
condition determining the ability level of the marginal worker as
(r + a)Uh − c(eˆ) = (r + a)Um (16)
Fig. 5 Tightness in the formal sector relative to tightness in the informal sector and search intensity
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By using Eqs. (1)–(3), it is clear that workers proceed to higher education if the expected
income gain of education exceeds their cost of education. However, as wages are endoge-
nous, we can use Eqs. (1) and (16) together with the first-order conditions for wages and
Eqs. (5), (7), and (11) together with the free entry condition. This gives the following
rewriting of condition (16):





where ol = θFl /
(
1 − σ Il
)1−γ , l = h,m. Equation (17) gives eˆ as a function of the
endogenous variables θFl and σ Il , l = m, h. Workers with e ≤ eˆ choose not to acquire
education, whereas workers with e > eˆ acquire education. Hence, eˆ and 1 − eˆ constitute
the manual and educated labour forces, respectively. The right-hand side of Eq. (17) is
the expected income gain of attaining education. This gain needs to be positive in order
for, at least some, workers to proceed to higher education. The fact that productivity is
higher for highly educated workers, which gives rise to an educational wage premium,
provides incentives for higher education. However, higher education may potentially also
be associated with losses in expected income. For example, if concealment costs are higher
for highly educated workers, i.e. κh > κm, relatively more attractive informal employ-
ment opportunities for manual workers will be foregone in case of higher education. This
reduces the incentives for education.15
Clearly, in order to study the non-trivial case where at least some workers proceed to
higher education, it is necessary to assume that there is a net gain in the expected income
of higher education. Thus, we need to assume that productivity differences betweenman-
ual and highly educated workers are sufficiently high, i.e. yFh/yFm > om/oh. Moreover,
to guarantee a non-trivial interior solution where at least some, but not all, individuals
choose to acquire education, the individual with the highest ability faces a very low cost
of education, more specifically c(1) = 0, and the individual with the lowest ability faces
a very high cost of education, i.e. lime→0c(e) = ∞. See the Appendix for the proof of the
existence of eˆ ∈ (0, 1).
3.6 Employment and unemployment
The equations determining the employment rates in the formal sector and the informal
sector, nFl , nIl , and the unemployment rates, ul, l = m, h, are given by the flow equilibrium
equations and the labour force identity.16 The official unemployment rate uol is given by
uol = ul + nIl . Solving for the employment and unemployment rates yields
nFl =
λIl
s + a + λFl + λIl
, nFl =
λIl
s + a + λFl + λIl
, l = h,m, (18)
ul = s + as + a + λFl + λIl
, uol =
s + a + λIl
s + a + λFl + λIl
, l = h,m. (19)
A comparison of the unemployment rates for manual and highly educated workers
requires assumptions about the size of the concealment costs. If concealment costs are
higher for educated workers, i.e. κh > κm, the official unemployment rate is always lower
for highly educated workers than for manual workers, i.e. uoh < uom. This is also what




ψl > 1, l = h,m, and hence
the informal sector is smaller than the formal sector, the actual unemployment rate is
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higher for the highly educated workers, uh > um, i.e. in this case, manual workers have a
lower actual unemployment rate than highly educated workers. The following Proposition
summarizes the results.
Proposition 1 The official unemployment rate is lower for highly educated workers,
uoh < uom, if they face higher concealment costs, κh > κm. The actual unemployment rate
is higher (lower) for highly educated workers, uh > um (uh < um), if they face higher con-









, l = h,m.
For proofs of all the Propositions, see the Appendix. The actual and the official total
number of unemployed workers are given by
UTOT = eˆum +
(
1 − eˆ)uh,




This section is concerned with the impact of more severe punishment of informal activ-
ities on labour market performance and educational attainment. We only consider fully
financed changes in enforcement policies. Hence, changes in the audit rate and the
punishment fees are always followed by adjustments in the tax rate so as to balance
the government budget constraint given by eˆnFmwFmz + eˆnImwImpα + (1 − eˆ)nFhwFhz+
(1 − eˆ)nIhwIhpα = R. Rewriting this budget constraint in terms of producer wages using
ωFm = wFl (1 + z) and ωIl = wIl (1 + pα + κl), l = m, h yields
zeˆnFmwFm
1 + z +
pαeˆnImwIm
1 + pα + κm +
z
(
1 − eˆ) nFhwFh
1 + z +
pα
(
1 − eˆ) nImwIh
1 + pα + κh = R (20)
where R is the exogenous revenue requirement.
From (40), it follows that an increase in the audit rate or the punishment fee, p or α, or
an increase in the tax rate, z, will, for a given tax base, always increase government rev-
enues. The tax base may, however, fall and thereby reduce revenues. If we assume that we
are located on the positively sloped side of the “Laffer curves”, the analysis is straightfor-
ward. Such an assumption implies that the direct effect of taxation and punishment on
government revenues will always dominate the impact on revenues since the tax base may
be reduced. An increase in the audit or punishment rate then always calls for a reduction
in the tax rate in order to regain a balanced government budget. A fully financed increase
in the punishment of the informal sector then induces ψl to increase both because pα
increases and because z falls.
Although the most likely scenario is when higher punishment rates call for tax reduc-
tions in order to fulfil the government budget, the results obtained in this section for the
impact of higher relative punishments of informal activities on producer wages, tightness,
search, employment, and unemployment rates do not depend on this assumption. The
reason is that these variables are only affected by the wedge, ψl, and not directly by z and
pα. However, which will become clear, as educational attainment could be discouraged
by a direct increase in taxation which, in turn, may have a compositional effect on total
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unemployment, the repercussions through the government budget constraint will be of
importance for these variables.
To illustrate this, we discuss the potential scenario where the government revenue falls
as harsher punishment of the informal sector is implemented, and the government needs
to increase the tax rate in order to balance the budget.17 In this case, when there is a
simultaneous increase in z and pα, there will be less sizeable adjustments in the labour
market outcome variables (for example, producer wages, ωjl, and employment rates, n
j
l)
as these variables are only affected by the wedge, ψl, which is not altered as much when
both z and pα increase. The tax base adjustment of importance in this case is then the
number of educated workers. The stock of educated workers is affected by the reform
both because the wedge is altered but also directly as z enters into (37) for given wedges.
With the effect working through the wedge being smaller in this case, the higher tax rate
is reducing the incentives to acquire higher education through the direct effect. This tax
base adjustment then reduces tax revenues. However, as long as the direct impact on R
dominates the negative effect on the tax base through less education, the increase in z
will balance the government budget. This scenario will not alter the results in the labour
market analysis considering the effect of more harsh punishment of the informal sector on
producer wages, tightness, search, employment, and unemployment rates. The reason is,
as said, that these variables are only affected by the wedge,ψl. The required increase in z in
the above considered case only implies that ψl increases by less than if z was reduced, and
the effect on the variables will be less sizeable. In fact, even if z increases to such an extent
thatψl actually falls, the results will hold.18 Moreover, it is of no importance for the results
which side of the Laffer curves we are located on. However, the repercussions through the
government budget constraint will be of importance for educational attainment and thus
for the composition of unemployment.
In the budget constraint in (20), potential auditing costs are left out. To include audit-
ing costs will not affect any of the Propositions we derive in this section. However, it
affects the welfare analysis as it tends to favour costless taxation and punishment fees at
the expense of auditing. The implications for the case of auditing costs is shown in the
Appendix.
4.1 Sector allocation
Although the results of fully financed punishment of informal activities in Propositions
2 and 3 hold irrespective of how the government budget restriction is affected, to stress
the intuition, we present the results based on the standard case when an increase in
p or α increases relative punishment ψl.19 The effects on the allocation of search and
employment across the formal and the informal sector are summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2 A fully financed increase in the relative punishment of the informal sector,
ψl , will reallocate search intensity and employment towards the formal sector, i.e. σ Il falls,
nFl increases, and nIl falls.
More zealous enforcement will make informal work less attractive, inducing unem-
ployed workers to reallocate their search effort towards the formal sector. In addition,
when search is reallocated towards the formal sector, the wage bargaining position
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strengthens for firms in the formal sector whereas it falls for firms in the informal sector.
The lower producer wages in the formal sector stimulate formal firms to open vacancies,
while at the same time, informal firms are discouraged to open new vacancies as they now
face higher producer wages. As a consequence that both vacancies and search effort are
reallocated towards the formal sector, the formal sector employment rate increases at the
expense of informal employment. These mechanisms can explain the empirical findings
in Almeida and Carneiro (2012) who use data on inspections carried out in Brazil.
4.2 Unemployment rates
As became clear in Proposition 2, employment in the formal sector increases at the
expense of employment in the informal sector following more severe punishment of the
informal sector. While this is somewhat expected, it is a priori not clear what would
happen to the unemployment rates. We have the following results:
Proposition 3 A fully financed increase in the relative punishment of the informal sec-
tor, ψl , will always cause the official unemployment rate (uol ) to fall, whereas the actual














ψl > 1. The reason for this is that the large concealment costs discour-
age workers from searching, and firms from opening vacancies, in the informal sector.
Increased punishment of the informal sector will encourage further reallocation of search
and workers away from the informal sector, where relatively efficient search methods are
used, towards the formal sector. Total search efficiency then falls, inducing unemploy-
ment to increase. The fact that search becomes less efficient when reallocated towards the
formal sector also has an impact on unemployment working through wage formation and
tightness. As search is reallocated towards the formal sector, the wage demand is mod-
erated in the formal sector and exaggerated in the informal sector. As the efficiency of
search in the formal sector increases by less than the efficiency of search in the informal
sector is reduced, the informal sector wage push will dominate the formal sector wage
moderation. Thus, the incentives to open up a vacancy in the formal sector subsides the
disincentives to open up a vacancy in the informal sector; the formal sector tightness will









ψl < 1. In this case, toomuch search and toomany firms are allocated into
the informal sector as there is a relative cost advantage of producing underground. Total
search efficiency would then improve when the government tries to combat the infor-
mal sector. The official unemployment rate always falls with more harsh punishment of
informal activities as workers to a larger extent become formally employed. In this unem-
ployment measure, workers in the informal sector were counted as unemployed to start
with.
4.3 Education
From (17), it is clear that more severe relative punishment of the informal sector affects
the number of educated workers as such policy increases ψl. This effect is further rein-
forced if the tax rate is reduced in order to assure a balanced government budget as the
increase in ψl is reinforced by a reduction in z. However, a reduced payroll tax rate will
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also have a direct effect on the stock of educated workers. More specifically, a reduction
in the tax rate, z, for a given wedge, will increase the number of educated workers. This
follows as taxation ismore harmful to high income earners, and consequently, a tax reduc-
tion will improve the income relatively more for high income earners. However, before
considering repercussions working through the budget constraint, let us first consider the
impact of a more zealous enforcement policy on education, for a given tax rate. We have
the following results:
Proposition 4 An increase in the audit rate, p, or in the punishment rate, α, which then
increases ψl, will increase (reduce) the number of educated workers if the relative produc-





g(κh, κm)om/oh,∞)where g(κh, κm) > 1 if κh > κm and
(
yFh/yIh
) ≥ (yFm/yIm) .
Proof. We know from above that the existence of an interior solution of eˆ requires
that yh/ym > om/oh. Differentiating the educational equation with respect to expected
punishment reveals that the impact on education is determined by the sign of
ym
∣∣dom/d (pα)∣∣−yh ∣∣doh/d (pα)∣∣which is equal to the sign of yFh/yFm−g(κh, κm) (om/oh),
where the term g(κh, κm) is larger than 1 for κh > κm and





































. See the Appendix for the full proof. Q.E.D.
The impact of a more zealous enforcement policy on educational attainment depends
on how attractive underground work is to manual and educated workers. When conceal-
ment costs are higher for highly educated workers, more zealous enforcement policies
tend to induce more workers to educate themselves. This follows as κh > κm implies that
manual workers to a larger extent face informal labour market opportunities. Therefore,
more zealous enforcement policies, which make it less attractive to work in the informal
sector, will be more harmful to manual workers. This effect may, however, be counter-
acted by the fact that highly educated workers have higher productivity and therefore
earn higher wages. As also informal activities are highly productive for these workers,
this implies that more harsh punishment, in this perspective, is more harmful for the
highly educated worker. Thus, even if highly educated workers face less informal employ-
ment opportunities, these opportunities are more profitable. This reduces educational
incentives.
Which of the two effects dominate will thus depend on how sizeable the differences
in informal employment opportunities and productivity are. If underground employment
opportunities in an economy foremost are available to manual workers, more harsh pun-
ishment of underground activities will push more workers into education, thus increasing
the stock of educated workers in the economy. However, if these employment opportu-
nities to a large extent also are available for highly educated workers, harder punishment
will harm highly educated workers more as these opportunities are more profitable to
productive workers. This leads to less workers educating themselves.
Kolm and Larsen IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:8 Page 16 of 36
Note that Proposition 4 only provides the sufficient conditions for when the educational
stock increases and when it falls with more harsh punishment of the informal sector with-
out considering the financing of the reform. Provided that we are located on the positively
sloped side of the Laffer curve, we can conclude the following:
Proposition 5 If an increase in the audit rate, p, or in the punishment rate, α, increases
the number of educated workers as given by Proposition 4, the financing of the reform will
further reinforce the increase in the stock of educated workers if z needs to fall so as to
balance the government budget.
This simply follows as taxation as a direct effect is more harmful for high income
earners, and consequently, a tax reduction, in order to maintain a balanced government
budget, will be more beneficial for high income earners, thus encouraging educational
attainments.
4.4 Unemployment
From Propositions 3, 4, and 5, it follows that more severe punishment of the informal
sector potentially increases the total number of unemployed workers. If the formal sec-
tor is larger than the informal sector, the unemployment rates for both manual and
highly educated workers are augmented. Moreover, if informal employment opportuni-
ties to a significantly larger extent are available for manual workers, more workers will
attain higher education when informal activities are punishedmore severely. This tends to
increase total unemployment as the actual unemployment rate, including informal work,
is higher for highly educated workers. Also, recall that this reallocation effect is reinforced
if we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laffer curve. Thus, in this case, total
unemployment increases both because the unemployment rates for all workers increase
and because workers are reallocated towards the sector where the unemployment rate is
highest. More generally, the Proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 6 A fully financed increase in the audit rate, p, or in the punishment fee,
α, increases(decreases) the number of unemployed workers if the relative productivity of











where g (κh, κm) > 1 if κh >
κm, where the financing of the reform further reinforces the reallocation effect if z needs to
fall so as to balance the government budget.
5 Welfare
This section is concerned with welfare analysis and the optimal design of punishment
policies. As shown above, increasing the punishment fees or the audit rates affect the
number of educated workers as well as the allocation of search and jobs across the for-
mal and informal sectors. This is essential when considering the impact on welfare. For
simplicity, we here let yFl = yIl , l = h,m.
Moreover, as the Hosios condition holds by assumption, as we have assumed that the
elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy is equal to the bargaining power of workers
in a Nash bargaining situation, we can disregard congestion externalities on the labour
market. Moreover, we do not need to be concerned about inefficiencies in terms of too
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low or too high educational attainments due to the holdup problem as the labour markets
for workers with high and low education are separated. This enables us to focus on other,
less well-known, distortions in this section. Clearly, however, if, for example, the Hosios
condition does not hold, the tax and punishment policies could potentially be used to
correct for congestion externalities.
The standard social welfare measure, analogous to the one described in, for example,
Pissarides (2000) under no discounting, is used and can be written as




Wm = (1 − um) ym − umkym
m, (22)
Wh = (1 − uh) yh − uhkyh










θ Il , l = m, h. The welfare measure consists of aggregate





k, l = m, h, and
minus the aggregate costs of education. With the assumption of risk neutral individuals,
we ignore distributional issues, and hence, wages will not feature in the welfare function.
See the Appendix for the derivation of this welfare measure.
Let us first derive the socially optimal choice of tightness, search, and stock of
educated workers by maximizing the welfare function in (21)–(23) with respect to
θFm, θ Im, θFh , θ Ih, σ Im, σ Ih , and eˆ. The socially optimal solution is solved from the following
seven conditions:20(
σ I∗l
)(γ−1) − (1 − σ I∗l )γ−1 = 0, → σ I∗l = 12 , l = m, h, (24)












)1−γ − c (eˆ∗) = 0. (26)
We can now compare the socially optimal solution with themarket outcome. From (11),
(14), and (15), it follows that the market solution for search and tightness coincides with
the socially optimal allocation if the imposed tax and punishment policy are such that
ψm = ψh = 1.21
This conclusion is intuitive as any policy that induces a deviation of the ψl, l = m, h
from unity implies a favourable treatment of the formal or the informal sector which,
in turn, induces a distortion in the sectorial allocation of search and tightness between
the formal and informal sectors. For example, if search to a larger extent is allocated to
the formal or informal sector instead of the other, the search is inefficiently used as less
efficient search methods in that sector need to be used. Moreover, as discussed in relation
to Proposition 3, a favourable treatment of either the formal or the informal sector induces
too many firms to open vacancies in that sector without accounting for the externality
they impose on others. In fact, unemployment is minimized when the allocation of search
and tightness across the formal and informal sectors is equal, and so is vacancy costs.
Thus, welfare is maximized when search and tightness are allocated equally across the
formal and the informal sector.
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Now let us compare the socially optimal stock of educated workers with the educational
outcome induced by the market. As the market outcome in terms of sectorial allocation
of search and tightness coincided with the socially optimal one when the government
lets the market face ψm = ψh = 1, we evaluate also the private outcome of education




(1 + z) ( 12 )1−γ − c
(
eˆ
) = 0. (27)
It immediately follows that a tax and punishment policy which implies that ψm = ψh =
1 will not provide incentives to the market to generate a socially optimal stock of educated
workers. Comparing (26) and (27), in fact, reveals that the market outcome induces too
few workers to educate themselves if formal and informal sector jobs face uniform treat-
ment in terms ofψm = ψh = 1. This follows as taxes, captured by (1+z) in (27), hit highly
educated workers more severely than manual workers, which reduces the incentives of
education. From this, we can conclude that welfare would increase if more workers chose
to educate themselves when ψm = ψh = 1.22
This discussion brings us to the government’s explicit choice of tax and punish-
ment policy. How should the government punish informal work in order to maximize
welfare?
5.1 Optimal punishment policy
The welfare analysis above indicates that it may be optimal to punish tax-evading activ-
ities carried out by manual workers more severely than those carried out by highly
educated workers. For example, if concealment costs are higher for highly educated work-
ers, a punishment policy with ψm = ψh = 1 is only possible if the manual workers to a
larger extent than highly educated workers face punishment of informal activities. That
is, pα has to be set relatively higher for manual workers if κm < κh in order to induce
ψm = ψh = 1.
This raises the question of whether it is possible or not to target the punishment
fees and audit rates towards the sector employing manual vs highly educated workers.
While governments potentially could, and in fact do,23 target their audits to specific
sectors, i.e. allowing for pm to differ from ph, this is less likely the case for the fee
rates.
To find the socially optimal choice of audit rates for the sector employing manual work-
ers and the sector employing highly educated workers, the welfare function in (21)–(23)
is maximized by the choice of pm and ph subject to the market reactions given by (11),
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, j = m, h. Evaluating the first-order conditions

























< 0 . (31)
Provided that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laffer curves, we can
conclude that
Proposition 7 Welfare is maximized when the sector employing manual workers is
audited to a larger extent than the sector employing highly educated workers, i.e. pm > ph
so as to get ψ∗h < 1 < ψ∗m if κh ≥ κm.
Proof. Evaluate the first-order conditions (28) and (29) at ψm = ψh = 1. From the






= 0, l = m, h. Then dWdpm |ψm=1= dWd(1−e)
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dph < 0 from (17). Thus, welfare
improves by reallocation of audits towards the manual sector. If κh = κm , pm = ph at
ψm = ψh = 1, welfare improves by setting pm > ph. If κh > κm, the results are reinforced
as pm > ph already when ψm = ψh = 1, and welfare improves by further increasing pm
and reducing ph. Q.E.D.
The result in Proposition 7 follows straightforwardly from the first-order conditions
when evaluated at the pm and ph which inducesψm = ψh = 1. The first term on the right-
hand side of Eqs. (28) and (29) then disappears as the distortions in search and allocation
of tightness across the formal and the informal sector are fully eliminated. In this case,
there are no other distortions present except that too few workers have chosen to educate
themselves. Recall that this is a consequence that taxation harms high income earners
relatively more. This distortion can, however, be corrected for by increasing the audits in
the manual sector and reducing them in the sector for highly educated workers, which
is captured by the right-hand side in (30) and (31). As informal sector work for manual
workers becomes less attractive when the government increases the number of audits,
manual workers are encouraged to acquire higher education. Similarly, less audits in the
highly educated sector further encourages workers to acquire higher education.
If concealment costs are higher in the sector employing highly educated workers, i.e.
κh > κm, there are even further incentives for the government to focus their audits
on the manual sector. This follows as high concealment costs work as a self-regulating
punishment of informal sector activities. Thus, if concealment costs are higher in the
sector employing highly educated workers, this sector will be in less need of audits as
concealment costs will do part of the job of limiting the size of the informal sector.
Moreover it follows that
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Corollary 8 The stock of educated workers is below its socially optimal value when the
audit rates are chosen so as to maximize welfare.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When deciding on the optimal audit rates, the government faces a trade-off between
two distortions and it is never optimal to fully eliminate one of them. When the stock of
educated workers is at its socially optimal level, there is an inefficient allocation of search
and jobs across the formal and informal sectors. Welfare then improves as the stock of
educated workers is reduced below its socially optimal level as this will only be a second-
order effect in comparison to the improved welfare following a more efficient sectorial
allocation.
5.2 Optimal punishment policy when concealment costs are high
In deriving the optimal audit rates in the previous section, it was implicitly assumed that
audit rates could be chosen freely without restrictions. For example, according to Propo-
sition 7, the audit rates should be chosen such that p∗m > p∗h so as to get ψ∗h < 1 < ψ∗m.
However, this is only possible if concealment costs are not too high. If, for example, κh > z,
then ψh > 1 even when ph is very small. Replacing the first-order condition in (29) with
the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker conditions, dWdph + μ = 0, ph ≥ 0, and μph = 0, where μ is
the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint ph ≥ 0, then suggests that the audit rate in the
sector should be set as low as possible when κh > z. Concealment costs are simply high
enough to self-regulate the size of the informal sector facing highly educated workers, and
there is no need for additional audits of this sector.24
Taking off in real-world observations from high-income economies, this may not be
an unrealistic scenario. Evidence indicates that manual workers, or workers with a lower
level of formal education, to a substantially larger degree face informal employment
opportunities compared to highly educated workers. Pedersen and Smith (1998) using
comprehensive survey data find that almost half of the informal sector activities in
Denmark is carried out within the construction sector. They also find that around 70 % of
the total hours performed in the informal sector is carried out within the service sector
or construction sector.
Potential explanations for why manual, in contrast to highly educated, workers engage
in informal activities are that manual workers to a larger extent work in industries which
handle cash payments or are to a lesser extent subject to third-party reporting. Firms
and workers in industries dealing with cash payments, or which to a lesser extent are
subject to third-party reporting, will find it easier, and thus less costly, to conceal their
tax evasion. Taking this at face value implies that concealment costs for highly educated
workers, κh, could be very large. If κh is assumed to approach infinity, informal employ-
ment opportunities facing highly educated workers will become infinitely small, leading
to that basically no firms will post informal sector vacancies to highly educated workers
and none of the highly educated workers will allocate search effort into the informal sec-
tor. All the results derived in Propositions 1 to 6 account for this special case, including the
now clear-cut result that higher punishment fees, or a general increase in the audit rate,
encourage more workers to educate themselves. This follows as less workers will remain
as manual workers as the foregone informal employment opportunities when attaining
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education has become less attractive. Moreover, the socially optimal audit rate is again
being determined by an audit rate which implies that p∗m is set large enough so as to get
ψ∗m > 1, although not high enough to induce an efficient stock of educated workers.
5.3 Multiple equilibria
Again, consider the case when the government can target the audits towards the sectors
for manual and highly educated workers. Thatψl = (1+plα+κl)/(1+z) can be obtained
both through high tax and enforcement rates and through low tax and enforcement rates
raises the issue of multiple equilibria.25 The relationship between the punishment rates
and the tax rate in each sector can then be written as plα = ψ¯l(1 + z) − (1 + κl) where
the wedge in each sector is set to some fixed value ψ¯l. A 1-unit increase in z followed by
an increase in plα by ψ¯l units maintains the relative punishment rate given by ψ¯l.
From the government budget constraint in (20), it is clear that any revenue requirement
could then be reaped through such simultaneous increases in z and plα, if it was not for
adjustments in the stock of educated workers. This follows as the tax base in terms of
producer wages,ωjl, and employment rates, n
j
l, only depends onψl whereas education falls
with higher taxes for given wedges. The fact that the tax base falls with higher taxation
through reduced incentives for education opens up for the possibility of two equilibria
where the government can collect the same revenue although at different levels of tax and
enforcement rates.
In the high tax and enforcement economy, very few workers may choose to educate
themselves which reduces the tax base and thus inducesmodest tax revenues even though
tax rates are high (negatively sloped side of the Laffer curve). In the low tax and enforce-
ment economy, in contrast, many workers find it worthwhile to educate themselves
which induces a large tax base which enables the government to obtain equally high rev-
enues despite low tax rates (positively sloped side of the Laffer curve). This scenario is
potentially possible in our model.
The scenario is shown graphically in Fig. 6 in terms of a Laffer curve with tax rev-
enues, R, on the vertical axis whereas the horizontal axis captures the tax rate, z, for given
wedges, ψ¯l. As the only tax base adjustment taking place is with regard to education, the
direct effect is fairly strong indicating that revenues always tend to increase with z (the
filled curve). However, the direct effect becomes less strong as taxation becomes heavier
because there are fewer highly educated workers to tax. On the other hand, the response
in terms of the number of workers acquiring higher education is stronger when z is low.
This is captured by the convex cost function for education. Including auditing costs into
the government budget constraint clearly tends to increase the likelihood of being in a
situation where an increase in tax rate, and increases in plα so as to keep ψ¯l constant,
no longer increases government revenues, thus also increasing the likelihood of multiple
equilibria (dotted line in Fig. 6).
In the case of two equilibria, the low tax and enforcement equilibria is preferable from
a welfare point of view. As was seen in Section 5.1, it was optimal to correct for the dis-
tortion in terms of that too few workers did choose to educate themselves. However, it
was not optimal to fully correct for this distortion, leaving the educated stock below a
socially optimal value, since distortions on the labour market then became inefficiently
high. Clearly, the high tax and enforcement economy worsens the problem by inducing an
educational stock which is, for the same wedge, even further away from what is socially
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Fig. 6 The Laffer curve; revenue R as a function of payroll taxes, z
optimal. This leads the government to use the wedges to push the economy further away
from an efficient labour market outcome in order to correct for this additional distortion
in education. Both the labour market distortions and the educational distortion is in this
economy larger at the socially optimal wedges than at the socially optimal wedges chosen
under the low tax and enforcement economy.
6 Conclusions
There has recently been an intensified focus on issues related to tax evasion and informal
activities from both a policy and research perspective.26 The study by Kleven et al. (2011),
which conducted a large field experiment in Denmark, made it possible to address, and
convincingly answer, a number of questions related to tax compliance behaviour that had
not been answered before.
This paper uses this knowledge to investigate the general equilibrium implications of
informal sector activities on economic performance. A number of questions can be asked.
How will informal employment opportunities affect labour market performance and edu-
cational attainments? Can informal jobs really be turned into formal jobs by more zealous
punishment policies? And if so, to what extent will formal sector jobs replace jobs in the
informal sector?
In order to address these questions, we develop a four-sector equilibrium search
and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational
choice. We find that informal activities reduce the incentives to acquire higher edu-
cation if informal employment opportunities mainly are available to low-educated
workers. More zealous enforcement policies will in this case improve educational incen-
tives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining a low-educated worker. Moreover,
we find that stricter enforcement policies will create new jobs in the formal sector,
although most likely to a lesser extent than the number of jobs destructed in the infor-
mal sector. This will lead to an increase in the actual unemployment rates although
the official unemployment rates fall. Finally, characterizing the optimal enforcement
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policies, we find that relatively more audits should be targeted towards the sector
employing low-educated workers; elsewise, a too low stock of educated workers could
materialize.
Including unemployment insurance and that a successful audit implies a termination of
a match are possible extensions which are on our agenda for future research.
Endnotes
1A number of studies have studied various implications of education in search and
matching models. See, for example, Acemoglu (1996) and Charlot et al. (2005).
2Productivity differences between formal and informal work are usually considered to
be very important in the literature on informality in low- and middle-income countries.
See La Porta and Shleifer (2014).
3Note that this literature considers, as do we, workers and firms that either fully oper-
ate in the informal sector or not, rather than partially doing so. The traditional literature
on tax evasion, in contrast, focused mainly on under-reporting of income. See Alling-
ham and Sandmo for a seminal paper on tax evasion where under-reporting of income is
modelled as a decision made under uncertainty. Thus, tax evasion can be seen both as an
intensive margin decision and as an extensive margin decision, where our focus is on the
latter.
4See also Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) for a model based on a similar set-up
calibrated by use of flow data from Brazil.
5More specifically, they a use a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model to
analyse and estimate the size of the informal sector of 162 countries around the world.
They define the sector as given by all market-based legal production of goods and services
that are deliberately concealed from public authorities either to avoid payment of taxes
or social security contributions or to avoid meeting certain legal labour market standards
or avoid complying with certain administrative procedures. Thus, the definition does not
include crimes like burglary, robbery, and drug dealing.
6The availability and accessibility of information to authorities on jurisdictional owner-
ship, accounting records, and banking, are divided into five categories according to if the
standards are “in place”, “in place but there is need for improvements”, and “not in place”.
The index is constructed as the proportion of the five categories that are in place. Thus,
the index takes on values between 0 and 1, where index value 1 is given to countries that
have all the standards in place.
7A country with relaxed regulations against tax evasion does not automatically make it
attractive to work in the informal sector or the opposite if the regulation is strict. If taxes
are very low, the strictness of the regulation against tax evasion becomes less relevant for
tax evasion.
8Problems with holdups can appear if workers make their educational investment prior
knowing what type of employer they will meet, as for firms making their investments
in physical capital prior knowing what type of worker they will meet, as they pay the
full cost of the investment but only reap part of its benefits. As firms may meet a low-
educated worker, they have lower incentives to invest in capital, and as workers may meet
a firm with low capital, they have lower incentives to invest in human capital. This tends
to induce underinvestments in both physical and human capital from a social point of
view. This problem is, however, ruled out in our paper as educated workers direct their
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search towards jobs exclusively for educated workers (see Acemoglu 1996; Acemoglu and
Shimer 1999).
9Everyone receives the transfer R. The government cannot exclude the informal sector
workers as the government does not knowwho the informal sector workers are (if it did, it
could punish all of them).We disregard unemployment insurance as these will complicate
the model significantly and in order to keep the formal and informal sectors as symmet-
ric as possible. In the presence of unemployment insurance, informal sector workers will
also receive unemployment insurance. As formal sector workers do not receive unem-
ployment insurance, this will tend to raise formal sector wages but will have no direct
impact on informal sector wages. Therefore, unemployment insurance will tend to reduce
the supply of formal sector jobs relatively to informal sector jobs.
10It is natural to think that α ≥ z as the punishment fee should at least cover the evaded
taxes.






1 if ψl  1.
12An appendix with the equations and derivations is available upon request.
13See Charlot et al. (2005) for a study that investigates the educational decision in a
search and matching framework when education is time consuming.
14The costs of education can capture a number of things, for example, direct costs of
education such as tuition fees. Workers with high ability may face lower costs of this type
due to, for example, scholarships. Also, such direct costs of education can be managed
by student loans in a time when the worker has no funds and just entered the labour
market. Workers need to pay these loans back, with interest, also in many periods after
the education has ended. Thus, although the educational attainment is a once and for all
investment, the cost of the education can be paid in future periods. The results on how
punishment policies affect labour market and educational outcomes will not change if we
let c(e) = (r+a)c˜(e)where r+a is the overall interest rate and c˜(e) is the cost of attaining
the education. The costs of education can also capture the indirect cost, such as effort
costs, of being a highly educated worker.
15See the Appendix for the proof that oh < om when κh > κm.
16For highly educated workers, λFhuh(1 − eˆ) = (s + a) nFh(1 − eˆ), λIhuheˆ = (s + a) nIh
(1 − eˆ) and nFh + nIh = 1 − uh, and for manual workers, λFmumeˆ = (s + a) nFmeˆ, λImumeˆ =
(s + a) nImeˆ, and nFm + nIm = 1 − um.
17This could, for example, be the case if we have auditing costs in the government bud-
get constraint. It is often assumed that taxes and punishment fees are cheap government
instruments whereas audits are costly to carry out.
18Let us provide an illustration of the rather peculiar case when z increases to such
extent that ψl actually falls with the reform. In this case, an increase in the relative pun-
ishment of the informal sector instead takes place through a reduction in the informal
punishment which increases the government revenues. This in turn enables a reduction
in z which, in this special case, is large enough to increase ψl. And through the large
reduction in z, the punishment of the informal sector has increased relative to the tax-
ation of the formal sector as taxation has fallen significantly. Although the results in
the analysis of the impact of fully financed punishment of informal activities on pro-
ducer wages, search, tightness, unemployment, and employment rates holds irrespective
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of how the government budget restriction is affected, to stress the intuition, we present
the results in terms of the standard scenario in the paper.
19That is, the corresponding adjustment in z in order to regain a balanced budget
implies that z either falls or does not increase to such an extent inducing ψl to fall. See
the footnote for this special case.
20See the Appendix for the second-order conditions.
21When ψm = ψh = 1 is imposed on the private solution, it follows from (14) and
(15) that tightness in the formal and the informal sector is equal and that search must be
split equally between the formal and the informal sector, i.e. σ I = 12 from (11). Imposing
σ I = 12 and θFl = θ Il , l = m, h, under the assumption of no discounting, in (14) and (15),
yields the same expression as (25).
22There may, of course, be other more direct instruments if the pure aim is to correct
for inefficiencies in the educational level in an economy, but nevertheless, it should be
acknowledged that the wedge actually has an impact on the number of educated workers
and thereby potentially has an impact on welfare in the economy.
23See, for example, Kleven et al. (2011).
24This clearly holds also for the manual sector if concealment costs are higher than the
tax rate.
25The general principal in this section holds also when the government cannot target
the audits. It is then not possible for the government to increase the tax rate holding
both wedges constant through adjustments in plα as κl differs across the sectors. The
government would then increase pα so that the wedges marginally change. There would
then be marginal adjustments in the producer wages and employment rates.
26The OECD recently initiated the “Global forum of transparency and exchange of
information for tax purposes” (OECD 2012), whereas the European commission con-
ducted the first EU-wide comparable questionnaire in order to increase the knowledge
about tax evasion in Europe (see EC (2007)).
Appendix
The model is given by
(











ψl, l = m, h. (32)
where ψl = 1+pα+κl1+z






1 + k θ
F
l(
1 − σ Il
)1−γ
)
l = m, h, (33)












, l = m, h, (34)









1 − σ Il
)1−γ
)
, m = h, l, (35)








, m = h, l. (36)
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Educational choice








s + a + λFl + λIl
, nFl =
λIl
s + a + λFl + λIl
, l = h,m, (38)
ul = s + as + a + λFl + λIl
, uol =
s + a + λIl
s + a + λFl + λIl
, l = h,m. (39)
Budget constraint in terms of producer wages using ωFm = wFl (1 + z) and ωIl = wIl (1 +
pα + κl), l = m, h, yields
zeˆnFmwFm
1 + z +
pαeˆnImwIm
1 + pα + κm +
z
(
1 − eˆ) nFhwFh
1 + z +
pα
(
1 − eˆ) nImwIh
1 + pα + κh = R (40)
where R is the exogenous revenue requirement.
Tightness relatively to search intensity




)1−γ < θFx(1−σ Ix )1−γ when κt > κx in the following way. Differentiating
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Existence of eˆ ∈ (0, 1)
Consider the educational Eq. (37). For a non-trivial solution, there needs to be a net gain
in expected income of higher education. Thus, yFh/yFm > om/oh. Moreover, to guarantee a
non-trivial interior solution where at least some, but not all, individuals choose to acquire
education, the individual with the highest ability faces a very low cost of education, more
specifically c(1) = 0, and the individual with the lowest ability faces a very high cost of
education, i.e. lime→0 c(e) = ∞.
In the case κh ≤ κm, then om/oh < 1, and hence, yFh/yFm > om/oh holds as yFh > yFm.
If educated workers face higher concealment costs than manual workers κh > κm, then
we need to assume that the productivity gain of education is large enough to assure that
yFh/yFm > om/oh holds, which is possible as the right-hand side is independent of yl.
Relative unemployment rates (Proposition 1)
Unemployment is increasing in concealment costs if ψl > 1. Hence, if κt > κx, then
ut > ux if ψl > 1. We show that in the following way, ut > ux if and only if
s/
(




s + λFt + λIt
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We substitute for the derivatives and the first-order condition for search intensity to













































































































⎟⎠. Hence, unemployment increases with
ψl, and hence, ut > ux when yFh/yIl ≥ 1 and κt > κx.
The official unemployment rate facing t workers is higher than the official unem-













s + λFx + λIx
)








, which is true
when λFx > λFt and λIx > λIt , that is, when κt > κx.
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Impact of higher punishment on sector allocation (Proposition 2)
Raising the audit rate pl or the punishment fee α increases the wedge, ψl =
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Impact of higher punishment on unemployment rates (Proposition 3)
Raising the audit rate p or the punishment fee α increases the wedge, ψl =






















































Substituting for the derivatives and the first-order condition for search intensity, we

















































































The impact on the official unemployment rate resulting from an increase in the audit



























s + λIl + λFl
)2
Impact of higher punishment on education (Propositions 4 and 5)
A closer examination of (37) reveals that changes in the audit rates or punishment rates
affect the share of educated workers, 1 − eˆ, through ψl only, whereas changes in the tax
rate, z, have a direct effect on 1−eˆ in addition to the effects working throughψl. Therefore,
in order to consider the effects of a fully financed change in the punishment rates on the
number of educated workers, we have to account for repercussions on 1 − eˆ following
adjustments in the tax rate. However, let us first consider the impact on 1− eˆ of a change
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1 + z , l = h,m, (44)




∂ (pα) |z = −
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where ol = 1(yFl /yIl)ψl
kθ Il(
σ Il



























< 0, l = h,m. (45)
For existence of an interior solution for education, we need yFhoh − yFmom > 0. Hence,




dψm > 0. As
dol
dψl , l = h,m is negative, and yFh/yFm >




∣∣∣∣ > yFh/yFm > om/oh. (46)
then education increases with pα . Consider the case where κh > κm. As ψl increases
with κl, then for such a solution to exist, we need that
∣∣∣ doldψl
∣∣∣ , l = m, h is decreasing in
concealment costs whereby
∣∣∣ domdψm
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ dohdψh
∣∣∣. We first show that that is the case. Multiply






















, l = h,m.
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Substituting for the tightness equations, 1 − kθFl(
1−σ Il
)1−γ = 1 − ol = k (r + s + a) (θFl ) 12 2
and 1 − kθ Il(
σ Il






















, l = h,m, (47)
where Al = (ol+1)( yFl
yIl
ol+ 1ψl



























































































































































































dκl < 0, so when κh > κm, then
∣∣∣ domdψm






dψl < 0 both because the numerator decreases withψl and the denomina-

























= g (κh, κm) om/oh > yFh/yFm > om/oh,
where
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when κh > κm and
yFh
yIh
≥ yFmyIm (or equivalently
yFh
yFm
≥ yIhyIm ) as the denominator of
∣∣∣ doldψl
∣∣∣

















g (κh, κm) omoh ,∞
]
education falls with pα.
Impact of higher punishment on unemployment (Proposition 6)
Raising the audit rate p or the punishment fee α increases the wedge, ψl =
(1 + plα + κl) / (1 + z). Differentiating total unemployment with respect to ψl gives
dUTOT
dψl
= deˆdψl (um − uh) + eˆ
dum
dψl
+ (1 − eˆ)duhdψl
The last two terms are positive (≤ 0) when (yFl /yIl )ψl is larger than one (≤ 1). The first


















ψm ≥ 1 as then (um − uh) < (=)0 and deˆdψl < 0. However, when
yFl
yIl
ψl < 1 and









g (κh, κm) omoh ,∞
]
, then deˆdψl > 0 and
dUTOT
dψl has an ambiguous sign.





















dψl < 0 when
deˆ



















For simplicity, we here let yFl = yIl , l = h,m. Wemake use of a utilitarian welfare function,
which is obtained by adding all individuals’ steady state flow values of welfare and let
r + a = ra. This accounts for that both the formal and the informal economy generate
welfare in the economy. The social welfare function is written as














vjmraV jm + nImraJlawm ,















h + nIhraJlawh − c(e).





mraJjm +∑j=F ,I vjmraV jm and∑j=F ,I njhraJjh +∑j=F ,I vjhraV jh in the welfare
function. Moreover, we assume that the concealment costs for tax evasion-facing firms
are payments to “lawyers” who only engage in concealing taxable income for other firms.
The welfare function therefore includes nImraJ lawm = nImwImκm and nIhraJ lawh = nIhwIhκh.
This assumption enables us to disregard from the waste associated with tax evasion if
firms only pay these expenses to nobody.
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By making use of the asset equations, imposing the flow equilibrium conditions as well
as the government budget restriction in (40), and considering the case of no discounting,
i.e. r + a → 0, we can write the welfare function as




Wm = (1 − um) ym − umkym
m, (50)
Wh = (1 − uh) yh − uhkyh










θ Il , l = m, h. This welfare measure is analogous to the
welfare measure described in, for example, Pissarides (2000) as it includes aggregate pro-





k, l = m, h. With the
assumption of risk neutral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence wages
will not feature in the welfare function.We have to find the socially optimal choice of audit
rates for the sector employing manual workers and the sector employing highly educated
workers; the welfare function in (49)–(51) is maximized by choice of pm and ph subject to
the market reactions given by (32), (35), (36), (37), and (39) and the government budget
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= (1 − eˆ) dWhdψh
dψh
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, j = m, h. Evaluating the first-order conditions


























Let us first derive the socially optimal choice of tightness, search, and stock of educated
workers by maximizing the welfare function in (49)–(51) with respect to θFm, θ Im, θFh , θ Ih,
σ Im, σ Ih , and eˆ. The socially optimal solution is solved from the following seven conditions:(
σ I∗l
)(γ−1) − (1 − σ I∗l )γ−1 = 0, → σ I∗l = 12 , l = m, h, (56)












)1−γ − c (eˆ∗) = 0. (58)
From the first-order conditions for tightness in the formal and informal sector for man-














2 = ul l = m, h, which gives θFl = θ Il .
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Substitute θFl = θ Il into the first-order condition for search effort, ∂W∂σ Il = 0, and the follow-
ing condition determines the social optimal level of search:
(
σ Im
)γ−1 − (1 − σ Im)γ−1 = 0.
This yields σ Il = 12 , l = m, h. Substitute σ Il = 12 , l = m, h into 2sk
(
θ Il






2 = ul [1 + k
l] , l = m, h, which yields the four equations in (57) determining
θFm, θ Im, θFh , and θ Ih in equilibrium. The socially optimal educational stock is determined
by ∂W/∂
(
1 − eˆ) = Wh (eˆ)−Wm = yh [1 − uh [1 + k





) = 0. Now use the equations determining the optimal levels of tightness, 2sk (θ Il ) 12 =




2 = ul [1 + k
l] , l = m, h, and the equation for the optimal edu-
cational level given by (58). To show that we have a global maximum, we differentiate W
with respect to σ Il , θ Il , θFl , l = m, h and 1 − eˆ to obtain(
σ I∗l
)γ−1 − (1 − σ I∗l )γ−1 = 0, l = m, h,




























− c (eˆ∗) = 0.
The associated Hessian matrix is then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(γ − 1) Sm 0 0 0 0 0 0
− kθ Im
2(σ Im)
2−γ (γ − 1) Im 0 0 0 0 0
kθFm
2(1−σ Im)2−γ
0 Fm 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 (γ − 1) Sh 0 0 0




)2−γ (γ − 1) 	Ih 0 0




)2−γ (γ − 1) 0 	Fh 0







)γ−1 0 (γ − 1) yh kθ∗Ih(
σ Ih










)− 12 + k (σ Il )γ−1
)
,





)− 12 + k (1 − σ Il )γ−1
)
, l = m, h. Therefore,
H1 = (γ − 1)
((
σ Im
)γ−2 + (1 − σ Im)γ−2) < 0 and the principal minors alternate in sign,
for all variable values, i.e. H2 = − (γ − 1)
((
σ Im




)γ−2 + (1 − σ Im)γ−2)ImFm (γ − 1) ((σ Ih)γ−2 + (1 − σ Ih)γ−2)IhFhc′ (eˆ∗)
< 0, by which we have a global maximum.
Optimal does not induce the socially efficient stock of education (Corollary 8)
Evaluating (52) and (53) at pem and peh such that the socially optimal level of educa-








dψm + dWdθ Im
dθ Im








1 − eˆ) [ dWdθFh dθ
F
h
dψh + dWdθ Ih
dθ Ih





dph . From the derivations of the socially optimal
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solution for θFm, θ Im, θFh , θ Ih, σ Im, σ Ih , it follows that
dW
dθFl





|ψl<1> 0, dWdθ Il |ψl<1< 0,
dWl
dσ Il
|ψl<1< 0 as the welfare function is maximized
at ψl = 1, i.e., dWdθFl |ψl=1=
dWl
dθ Il
|ψl=1= dWldσ l |ψl=1= 0. It then follows that dWdpm and
dW
dph |ψeh<1> 0.
Optimal punishment policy including auditing costs










1+pα+κh −ϕ(p) = R, where p is the total intensity of audits, p = pm+ph.
Adding costs of auditing has no impact on the positive analyses. The welfare function,
however, is equal toW = eˆWm +
∫ 1







+ dWd (1 − e)
d (1 − e)
dpm
− ϕ′(p) = 0,
dW
dph
= (1 − eˆ) dWhdψh
dψh
dph
+ dWd (1 − e)
d (1 − e)
dph











dψl , j = m, h. The optimal level of audits is reduced
in both sectors. The result from Proposition 7, that welfare is maximized when the gov-
ernment to a larger extent targets its audits to the manual sector, i.e. pm > ph if κh ≥ κm,
will still hold.
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